> the nature and measure of their punishments.[102]

He argued that the physician should apply to the minds of his patients a kind of mechanical pressure which, acted as 'the pressure of a splint upon a broken limb'. This, he thought would bring the 'shattered and crooked' thoughts of his patients into 'their original and natural order'. In short, as he claimed in his lectures on the association of ideas,

> Judgement and reason ... consist in dissolving ... false and erroneous associations, and combining facts together in a natural and related order, so as to obtain true results from them.[103]

Moral management was, in this light, a stimulus to the operations of nature and thus doing for the patient what he would, if he could, do for himself. It did, however, lead to some bizarre methods for straightening crooked thoughts.

> If all the means that have been mentioned should prove ineffectual to establish a government over deranged patients, recourse should be had to certain modes of coercion, such as confinement by means of a strait waistcoat or of a chair contrived for the purpose.

If this failed, the 'manager' could resort to the following:

> Privation of their customary pleasant food. Pouring cold water under the coat sleeve, so that it may descend into the armpits and down the trunk of the body. The shower bath continued for fifteen or twenty minutes. If all these modes of punishment should fail of their intended effect, it will be proper to resort to the fear of death. By the proper application of these mild and terrifying modes of punishment, chains will seldom, and the whip never be required to govern mad people.[104]

The physician's knowledge of the science of the mind also created another related duty. Rush explained that the physician:

> in the course of his life, ... will be called upon to give his testimony and sometimes an opinion in courts of justice, upon the influence of diseases upon the mind. To enable him to do this with correctness, it will be necessary for him to know what constitutes derangement; and what degrees of it should exculpate injuries, set aside testimony, or invalidate the disposition of property by a will. Much yet remains to be known upon this subject; and from the ignorance and error of our laws upon it, there is reason to believe cruelty and injustice are often perpetrated by them.[105]

Rush's *Lecture on the Medical Jurisprudence of the Mind,* delivered in 1810, was, according to George Corner, one of the first general

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reviews of the subject in the English language. Physicians who believed that their duties were confined to the knowledge and cure of diseases had, Rush warned, a very limited view of medicine. He argued that the science of medicine had reached a stage in which it could be called upon to perform other valuable services to society such as 'the protection of property and life' and 'the detection of fraud and guilt'. That part of the science of medicine which qualified a physician to perform these duties was called medical jurisprudence.

Like Percival, whom he frequently cites, Rush believed that the absence of reason annulled man's social compact; it disenfranchised him, suspended his liberty, his ability to make bargains, to keep promises and to give testimony. He was no longer a free agent, the performer or receiver of personal and social duties, and thus no longer a legal or moral person. Rush agreed with Percival that physicians were the best judges of sanity and that insanity was often partial or temporary, 'something which came and went by degree, being subject to fits of intensification and remittance, and which – if caught early enough and well treated – was as amenable to relief or cure as any disease'.[106] The knowledge of the mind was a solid basis for physicians to encourage the development of new institutions for the humane treatment of the insane, including the criminally insane. Rush, like many Edinburgh-trained reformers, held that the cruel and punitive practices of Bedlam and Newgate were the aberrant legacies of an unenlightened past. As he urged,

> We erect splendid and commodious buildings to confine persons, whom intellectual derangement has rendered dangerous to society, and we employ our skill and humanity to relieve them; but with an unmerciful impatience, we consign persons, whom moral derangement has rendered mischievous, to the exterminating ax and halter.[107]

In the new institutions for the recovery of the mentally sick and criminally insane, 'expiatory confinement and labour, and the power of medicine' would restore these lost souls to reason and religion.[108]

Knowledge of the principles of mental science also played an important part in the development of educational programmes and here again the physician had a moral duty to contribute his particular expertise:

> The mental science will enable a physician to advise a natural and just order for conducting the studies of youth, founded upon the gradual evolution of its faculties. He will begin with those branches

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> of science which are required by the senses and memory. These will be geography, natural history, civil history, and modern languages. Those branches of science which are acquired by the combined operations of the memory and understanding, will be postponed until a free and general intercourse is established by age and reflection between all the faculties of the mind.[109]

The education of the senses, moral and intellectual, also required an appropriate physical location and Rush advised that American schools and colleges should be situated in the countryside where the rural odours 'calmed the passions and strengthened the moral faculties in the perception of virtues'. Other physical causes could also act on the senses to enhance the possibilities of education, and Rush suggested that moderate labour, sleep, cleanliness, music and eloquence could be scientifically combined to produce correct associations of ideas in forming the mind.[110] He also advocated shaming techniques, instead of corporal punishment, so that discipline could be internalized and the child remain morally autonomous rather than bound too closely to authority. Self-determination, not servility, was the object of Rush's theory of punishment.

According to Rush, schools were the nurseries of wise and good men and thus the most essential institutions in a republic.[111] He believed that the development of free schools in every community, a system of colleges to train teachers, and a state university were essential for the formation of good citizens. He also considered it possible through the application of the principles of mental science to convert men into 'republican machines'. Only then, he argued, could they 'perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the government of the state'.[112] Rush's ideal education included practical or vocational subjects such as agricultural science and husbandry, knowledge of laws and government as well as the study of the traditional liberal arts. He insisted that Latin and Greek were useless to all but a small proportion of the population and that most students would benefit far more from the study of modern languages, especially their own. He suggested as well that instruction in speaking the Native American languages would be of benefit. By this means, 'young men might qualify themselves to become ambassadors to our Indian nations, or introduce among them a knowledge of the blessings of civilization and religion'.[113] Rush was instrumental in the creation of two institutes of higher learning, Franklin College and Dickinson College.[114]

Similar principles could be applied to the shaping of the female

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American mind. Women as the first teachers of their sons were essential to male education and thus, apart from the regular branches of female education, they should be instructed in 'the principles of liberty and government'.[115] Like his programme for the male youth of America, Rush's plan for young women was a particular education adapted to the new country and to women's role in it. The female republican virtues were to be inculcated through a course of reading which included moral essays, history, theology, poetry and travel literature. Novels, however, were unsuitable as they were full of intrigues and passions foreign to American manners. He rejected the view that novels promoted sympathy and argued that, on the contrary, novel reading could lead to the development of a corrupt form of sympathy,

> which is excited by the recital of imaginary distress, blunts the heart to that which is real; and, hence, we sometimes see instances of young ladies, who weep away a whole forenoon over the criminal sorrows of a fictitious Charlotte or Werther, turning with disdain at three o'clock from the sight of a beggar, who solicits in feeble accents or signs, a small portion only of the crumbs which fall from their fathers' tables.[116]

Natural philosophy was also important to the development of the female mind. Its application to the domestic and culinary sciences was useful, and knowledge of the principles of chemistry, astronomy, and geography would discourage female superstition. The other subjects that Rush recommended were practical ones: book-keeping, accounting, writing, singing (because it was good exercise for the lungs), and dancing (because it was a good substitute for drinking).[117]

Rush's views on female education were derived from many well-known sources. These included Rousseau's theory of education; Lord Kames's *Loose Hints on Education, chiefly concerning the Culture of the Heart*; Baron Haller's *Lectures to his Daughter*, and James Beattie's *Evidences of the Christian Religion Plainly Stated*. Moreover, his views were, like those he advocated for men, explicitly based on physiological assumptions. Women were, he explained, in both body and mind, different from men, a difference 'stamped upon both in the womb by the hand of nature'. While he believed that women must be educated to take up the duties of their social and domestic life, he also believed that there should always exist 'those degrees of inferiority and contrast in social life' which he carefully outlined in his lectures. Like Rousseau and contemporaries such as

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John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, he believed that many of the disorders of domestic and political society originated with the inversion of a natural social order.[118]

Not only was the physician-cum-mental scientist the best designer of educational systems for the youth of America; he was also qualified, by virtue of his knowledge, to take part in the public affairs of his country. The physician,

> from his knowledge of the debilitating effects of inactivity and confinement upon the understanding and passions, ... will be an enemy to slavery and a friend to liberty; and from his frequent opportunities of witnessing the destructive effects of the passions upon the human body, he will be the advocate of those governments only, which filter laws most completely from the passions of legislators, judges, and the people.[119]

From a medical as well as a moral point of view, slavery was a violation of the principles of the new republic. Republicanism rested on liberty, which in turn depended on the health of the people. According to Rush, slavery caused physical and mental disorders such as lock-jaw, melancholy and dietary diseases. In the slave master it caused a form of insanity which Rush termed 'negromania', initiated by the master's failure to comprehend that the practice of slavery violated the law of nature.[120] Rush petitioned for legislative action against slavery, founded the first American abolitionist society, and the first church for black Americans.

Dependence of any kind was, he believed, an impediment to democracy and good morals. After helping to revolutionize the political habits of Americans by fighting for independence from Britain, Rush set about changing the drinking habits of his countrymen by promoting wine, beer and cider in place of hard liquor. He conceived the notion of a 'truly republican beer' made from the sugar maple and a 'truly federal wine' made from native fruits. He also persuaded Thomas Jefferson that the widespread use of maple sugar would end American reliance on West Indian sugar and consequently reduce the practice of slavery to the status of an unnecessary evil. Jefferson, it is said, 'made determined but ultimately vain efforts to grow maple sugar trees at Monticello'.[121]

Rush was a fervent republican who believed not only that this form of government was the most Christian but that it was 'natural' and thus the most healthy. Like other reforming physicians of this period, most notably the Frenchman Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, his view of the interaction between mind and body, and his theory of the

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effect of moral and physical causes, led him to assess, from a medical perspective, the effects of the various forms of government on the health of people under its domain. For Rush this was not, as Pope had claimed, a contest for fools[122] and for him it mattered little whether a non-republican government was or was not well administered. Either way, the latter made its people sick. The French of the old regime, and indeed those under the tyranny of Napoleon, the Turks, the Chinese, the Spanish, the tribal governments of American savages and most others, including of course the American slaves, were all adversely affected by the forms of government under which they lived.

That the physician had a positive duty to lend his voice to the statesmen of the land was scientifically justified, in Rush's view, by the symmetry which existed between the minds of men and the governments they created.

> The wisdom discovered in the structure of the human mind of the individual, appears in the form of those institutions which have been copied from them, and contrived for the preservation and government of societies of public bodies of men.[123]

In its infancy, humankind was guided and preserved by a kind of 'social instinct'. As man advanced, or became more civilized and numerous, his newly awakened faculties required more sophisticated mechanisms to promote his well-being and preservation. Thus, in the course of time, a natural form of government evolved in which 'the same kind of powers are exercised over him, which were given to him for the government of himself'. Giving full rein to the analogizing skills which so impressed his students, Rush added that these powers in a well-organized government resemble the principal faculties of the human mind. For example,

> A House of Representatives, in which facts and business are collected for deliberation and discussion resembles the memory and the imagination. A Senate, in which the transactions of the House of Representatives are examined, amended, and arranged, performs the office of the understanding. The execution of the laws formed by these two legislative bodies, may be compared to the will, which by assenting to those laws, becomes a part of the legislature of the nation. The passions are the deputies of the supreme executive, and carry into affect all the good or evil which are fabricated by the legislative powers. The Courts of Justice may be compared to the moral faculty; the sense of Deity, to the acknowledgement of a supreme Being by oaths, or subscriptions to creeds; while the High Court of Errors and Appeals, or the Court of Chancery, resembles in its acts the conscience.[124]

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Despotic governments, in this view, were destructive, and as little suited to man's real nature 'as a mind composed wholly of a will and of passions' is capable of promoting the happiness of the individual. All governments, however, were inherently untrustworthy, for they were one of 'the curses of the Fall'. The physician's task, like that of any other virtuous citizen, was consequently to meliorate the negative aspects of government.[125]

Medicalized Ethics

Sympathy and Mutual Duties

Rush's medical ethics, like Gregory's and Percival's, was based on the common, mainly Scottish, doctrine of sympathy. But not only is the American's account of sympathy – or sensibility, as he often termed it – more explicit in his medical ethics than in those of his predecessors, he also brings out a physiological side to the concept that is at most hinted at in the earlier theorists. This is in keeping with his overall strategy of replacing moral theory with science (including, as required, the science of religion).

As was common among Edinburgh-trained physicians, Rush saw sympathy as due to a 'connection of feeling in the nerves' and performing a variety of functions ranging from the purely physiological to being the chief agent in the formation of ideas.[126] Sympathy was an innate capacity which provided the psychological basis for human bonding and thus for all love, charity, virtue and propriety, much like in Gregory and Percival. In his 'Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishment Upon Criminals and Upon Society', Rush claimed that it was the 'vicegerent of the divine benevolence in our world'. It was the principle which guided philanthropy, founded hospitals, erected schools and made human misery bearable. Sympathy was able to 'decide upon the quality of actions before they reach that divine principle of the soul [the moral faculty]'. It was therefore, he claimed, 'a hasty moral – a sudden sense of right'.[127]

Rush promoted the creation of public institutions (in this case, a penal code) in which the natural sympathy of citizens could best be fostered and false or 'abortive' sympathy, the sort produced in the novel-reading female, eliminated. He believed that all public punishment, especially capital punishment, was socially damaging. It destroyed, either through habit or through the arousal of abortive sympathy, the natural sympathy of the citizens who were impotent spectators of these cruel punishments. This was because sympathy

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within the whole of the human body was either active or passive. Active sympathy was connected to motion and sensation and passive sympathy only to sensation. Active sympathy was consequently increased by the repetition of impressions while passive sympathy was decreased. The same phenomena took place in the human mind. Here again, sensibility or sympathy was either active or passive. Passive sympathy was lessened by habit while active sympathy was increased. Sympathy without motion or action was, in other words, mere sensation. The hanging or flogging of a criminal became, if repeated in the sight of the same spectators, a 'sensational' act rather than the salutary moral lesson it was meant to be.[128] For Rush, the doctrine of sympathy was an essential component of the prevalent theory of the association of ideas, and the primary justification for the 'moral treatment' which, in the more advanced asylums and penitentiaries, had replaced the traditional methods of corporal punishment. He argued, for example, that because the human mind was constituted to respond, either actively or passively, to scenes of distress, the act of deliberately preventing a person from relieving the distresses of another, as in the case of the publicly punished criminal, was in effect the destruction of active sympathy. Writ large, this would inevitably be the end of those relations which alone bound a society together.

Similarly, for Rush, the education of the physician necessarily included a course of training designed to stimulate the active sympathy of the students by providing them with regular outlets for relieving the distress of their suffering patient. Hence, the importance of clinical and bedside training as a corrective to more passive theoretical learning.[129]

The doctrine of sympathy played as significant a role in Rush's medical ethics as it did in Gregory's and Percival's. It underlined the traditional precepts of medical etiquette and helped transform what might otherwise be viewed as mere politeness into therapeutically sound practice, based on a widely accepted theory of human nature. In his *Lectures on the Mind,* Rush illustrated the value of the doctrine of sympathy to the moral practice of medicine in his account of the peevish patient. In traditional medical ethics, it was common-sense advice that the physician should ignore the peevishness of patients. Illness and pain clearly affected the most equable of natures and for this reason might be indulged by the physician. However, viewed in the light of medical theory grounded in the doctrine of sympathy, peevishness was not merely an

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unfortunate change in the patient's character but a reliable sign of the disease's progress. Patients who changed suddenly 'from that passive and tranquil state of mind which attends the lowest stage of acute disease' to a state of peevishness, were, in fact, advancing triumphantly to the next stage of their illness.[130] Signs of peevishness, therefore, were to be viewed with relief rather than alarm or indignation. The state of peevishness was, as Rush explained, a gentle stimulus to the system which helped to bring it to the point of crisis. A physician's understanding of this was certainly an aid to his capacity for sympathy. It was a response, moreover, based on specialized knowledge available only to physicians who were trained in the science of the mind and who understood the reciprocal influences of the body and the mind. For a physician not to understand the process could be very dangerous to his patients. Physicians who were mistakenly offended by their patients' peevishness might act in such a way as to obstruct the natural progress of the disease and perhaps even arrest it in the 'acute stage', thus preventing it from running its course to the stage of 'crisis' and subsequently to full recovery. Knowledge of the physiological mechanism of sympathy could even, according to Rush, mean the difference between life and death. It was not merely a matter of etiquette, as important as that might be to the physician–patient relationship.

Sympathy, or the capacity to suffer with the suffering of others, also manifested itself in ways associated with the physician's duty to be benevolent. As Rush noted most dramatically in a lecture delivered in 1801,

> this noble sympathy, in physicians, is sometimes so powerful, as to predominate over the fear of death; hence we observe them to expose, and frequently to sacrifice their lives, in contending with mortal epidemics. The United States have lately furnished numerous instances of death in physicians, from their ardent attachment to their patients. The graveyards of Philadelphia alone, hold the precious relics of three and twenty members of our profession, who have died martyrs to this affectionate and heroic sympathy, since the year 1793.[131]

The sympathetic physician fulfilled other duties traditionally expected of him. According to Rush, he acted as the benefactor of his patients, both directly and indirectly, by performing gratuitous services on their behalf and by assisting in the creation of institutions designed to relieve their sufferings. Asked by a friend why he treated the poor free of charge, he responded (as Boerhaave

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had taught) that 'I esteem the poor my *best* patients, for God is their paymaster'.[132] Rush also praised the charitable practices of physicians such as Cullen, Heberden and Fothergill, who were known to have given not only their services free to the poor but also frequently substantial sums of money. Like Gregory and Percival, Rush had no hesitation in describing this aspect of the medical character as a predominant one and justifiably praiseworthy.

Physicians' Duties to Each Other

While Rush could proudly draw upon the philanthropic tradition of medicine and even insist, as his predecessors had, that all the great medical minds of the modern era were also true Christians, he was unable to disguise the animosity which prevailed among the members of his profession. Near the end of his life, he told his son James, then a student at Edinburgh, that John Gregory had often said that 'nothing could exceed the malice of rival authors except the rancor of rival physicians'. His own life, he added, 'would furnish a melancholy illustration of the truth of this remark'.[133]

Rush ascribed professional rivalry or, as he put it, 'this peculiar professional depravity', to the isolation and lack of social intercourse characteristic of contemporary practice, and to the decline of public worship. The first problem could be cured, he claimed, by a return to what Sir Thomas Browne had called, in his *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, 'promiscuous commensality'.[134] Physicians should, on this view, hold 'frequent social and convivial meetings' and dine amiably together at the same table. As for the second problem, he advised that they should regularly attend church services. 'There never was', he wrote, 'and never can be any real and permanent friendship or harmony between medical nor any other professional characters without religion.'[135]

He believed that there was no reason why physicians should not be united, as the other professions were, by 'mutual wants and necessities', such as the bonds of common labour and suffering, and by their professional obligation to increase knowledge. 'Even Devils', he wrote, evoking Milton, 'firm concord hold with each other.'[136] On a less lofty plane, however, he suggested that physicians should further demonstrate their professional solidarity by collecting fees for each other and by concealing each other's omissions, acts of forgetfulness, ignorance and errors.[137]

Rush encouraged strict observance of consultation etiquette. His lecture notes on the topic reflect the traditional pattern described by Gregory and Percival: 'In consultation first called, though younger,

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precede and remain last in the room, deliver the prescription, answer all questions, never visit alone. Punctuality to be observed." He also advised his students that they should share new remedies with their colleagues in difficult cases; that their charges should be uniform; that they should not steal each other's pupils or charge each other's sons and that they should be kind to the more 'decayed' members of the profession and their children.[138]

The Duties of Patients to Their Physicians

In 1808, near the end of his career, Rush delivered a controversial introductory lecture entitled, 'On the Duties of Patients to Their Physicians'. This was, he admitted, a topic which might be viewed as 'foreign to the characters and views of most of the gentlemen who compose this assembly'.[139] He thought, however, that upon reflection his audience would be convinced that knowledge of these duties was as essential to their careers as it was to the advancement of the science of medicine.

It should not be surprising, in a medical ethics derived from a social ethics based on reciprocal duties, that patients, like their physicians, also had duties which arose from their medical relationships.[140] Nevertheless, Rush broached the topic of patients' duties with some trepidation, and it is interesting to speculate why. A plausible explanation is that by directly addressing this topic he was making explicit what had always been implicit. Women's conduct books, and those on the respective duties of household servants, had always been most explicit on duties to husbands and masters. However, to address or refer to one's patients in a similar manner would probably have been considered presumptuous. Not only were all patients unceremoniously lumped in a group without distinction of rank, they were all placed in a subordinate position to their physician. It was this, perhaps, that was 'foreign' to the gentlemen who made up Rush's audience and this which later critics found so distasteful. Nevertheless, while the lecture on patients' duties is a source of embarrassment to modern physicians in search of ethical models compatible with our more egalitarian ideals, it is a splendid depiction of the early modern American patient as seen through the eyes of a well-meaning but somewhat exasperated elderly physician. Indeed, if every duty Rush proposed reflected a corresponding flaw on the part of patients in general, then a rough profile of the typical patient might be sketched as follows. He – Rush always referred to the male head of the household – was, on the whole, disappointing: gullible, fickle, miserly, inconsiderate,

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